Jennifer Loewenstein Setting the Record
Straight on Hamas
By Jennifer Loewenstein Oxford, UK 11 June 2006
A June 3rd poll conducted by Near
East Consulting based in Ramallah, Palestine shows that the overwhelming
majority of Palestinians support the Prisoner’s Agreement, an inter-factional
agreement signed by one member each of Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad,
the PFLP, and the DFLP inside Israel’s Hadarim prison this past May.
(1) The document implicitly recognizes Israel by accepting, among other
things, a Palestinian state in the lands occupied by Israel in the June
1967 war. News reports have paid a lot of attention
to the Prisoner’s Agreement in part because it accepts the Arab League
initiative (Saudi Plan) unanimously adopted by the Arab states
in Beirut in 2002 at the height of the Second Intifada. By calling for
an independent Palestinian state on the ‘67 lines in return for peace
with Israel, both the Saudi Plan and the Prisoner’s Agreement echo
the international consensus on Palestine since the mid 1970s. Israel
has completely ignored the Arab initiative despite overwhelming support
among the Palestinians. But the Prisoner’s Agreement has
also become the focal point of the most recent crisis in internal Palestinian
politics: Palestinian Authority president and Fatah deputy leader Mahmoud
Abbas has called for a national referendum on the document should Hamas
fail to adopt it as part of their official program. So far, Hamas has
refused and has labeled Abbas’ actions “illegal.” Not surprisingly, there is more to
the referendum story than ever makes it into the press. In this case,
the information omitted from the public record makes it possible for
the United States, Israel and their allies to continue to justify the
economic siege imposed on the Palestinian territories, a siege that
is causing Palestinian society to teeter on the brink of ruin. In their
rush to push forward a regional, pro-US and anti-democratic agenda,
those states allied against the Palestine national movement (including
Egypt and Jordan) have created the kind of humanitarian crisis one would
expect to find as the result of a natural disaster. No attention has been paid to what
the Hamas leadership is actually saying, or to critical factors such
as US efforts to build a 3,500 man militia around the office of Abbas
in an effort to encourage civil infighting or Israel’s recent approval
of a large shipment of arms and ammunition from Egypt and Jordan for
the equipping of the Presidential Guard. Abbas, who is supported by
the US, aims to increase the number of armed soldiers around him to
10,000. He is also aiming, with US support, to create a shadow government
that will undermine the legitimate one now controlled by Hamas.(2) It
should come as a surprise to no one that, in the words of Mohammed Nazzal,
a member of the Hamas government in exile, “Hamas will not submit
to blackmail…” (3) This is essentially the goal of Abbas’ call
for a referendum. There is no need to bring to a popular vote support
for the Prisoner’s Agreement. Overwhelming popular support for this
and other initiatives, including support for the two-state solution,
has long been documented. Most of the rhetoric damns Hamas for
refusing to follow Abbas’ instructions. Hamas remains the reason why
states should support the economic and political blockade on Palestine
although this does little more than fuel the “War on Terror” by
adding another organization to the blacklist of regional enemies. Labeling
Hamas a “terrorist organization” obscures the reality, however.
Its political leadership and its electoral/government program (i.e.
not its Charter) have put forth both reasonable and moderate demands.
Acceptance of an independent Palestinian state has long been part of
its strategic agenda. Its reputation as a “rejectionist” movement
stems in part from its unwillingness to act alone, without reciprocal
moves by Israel, a state whose extremist policies over the past 5 decades
have transformed the physical landscape of Palestine so dramatically
that the prospects for a genuine peace settlement today are bleaker
than ever. In his latest comments on Abbas’
decision to call the referendum, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert
summed up his government’s view of this effort insofar as it could
create a bridge toward peace talks with Israel. He said, "The referendum
is an internal game between one faction and the other.…It is meaningless
in terms of the broad picture of chances towards some kind of dialogue
between us and the Palestinians. It's meaningless." (4) Whether
the referendum ‘succeeds’ or ‘fails’ therefore, will be of no
consequence whatsoever in efforts to resume negotiations or as form
of leverage to end the deadly siege on the territories. II. Hamas accepts a two-state solution.
When asked by Newsweek-Washington Post correspondent Lally Weymouth
on 26 February 2006 what agreements Hamas was prepared to honor, the
new Hamas Prime Minister, Ismail Haniyeh answered, “the
ones that will guarantee the establishment of a Palestinian State with
Jerusalem as its capital with 1967 borders.” Weymouth went on, “Will
you recognize Israel?” to which Haniyeh responded, “If Israel declares
that it will give the Palestinian people a state and give them back
all their rights then we are ready to recognize them.” (5) This view
encapsulates the Hamas demand for reciprocity. In an interview with CNN’s Wolf
Blitzer four days after the PLC elections, the new Hamas Foreign
Minister, Mahmoud Zahar (considered the party’s hard-liner) remarked,
“We can accept to establish our independent state on the area occupied
[in] 1967.” Like Haniyeh and other Hamas members, Zahar insists that
once such a state is established a long-term truce “lasting as long
as 10, 20 or 100 years” will ensue ending the state of armed conflict
between Israelis and Palestinians. (6) Hamas government spokesman Ghazi
Hamad commented to reporters on 10 May 2006, “Yes, we accept an
independent state in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel
in the 1967 Middle East War. This attitude is not new and it is declared
in the government’s platform.” (7) In an effort to clarify the Hamas
position on Abbas’ call for a referendum, Hamas parliamentary speaker
Aziz Duweik explained that it had nothing to do with a lack of support
for the two-state settlement. “Everybody in Hamas says ‘Yes’ to
the two-state solution,” he said. “The problem comes from the fact
that the Israelis so far [have not said they] accept the 1967 borders…between
the two states.”(8) Other leaders are just as explicit.
“Hamas is clear in terms of the historical solution and an interim
solution. We are ready for both: the borders of 1967, a state, elections,
and agreement after 10-15 years of building trust,” commented Usama
Hamdan, the Hamas Chief Representative in Lebanon. (9) Notable here
is that his remarks were made in 2003 well before the Hamas victory
of January 2006. Indeed, it should be pointed out that most of the on-the-record
comments to this effect were made prior to these elections. Additional Hamas spokespersons who
have made explicit reference to acceptance of an independent Palestinian
state on the 1967 lands include Sheikh Ahmad Haj Ali, a Muslim
Brotherhood leader and Hamas legislative candidate currently imprisoned
in Israel (interviewed in July 2005); Muhammad Ghazal, Hamas
spokesperson also currently in an Israeli jail (Sept. 2005); Hasan
Yousef, West Bank political leader (August 2005); and the Hamas
Electoral Manifesto Article 5:1 which calls for “adherence to
the goal of defeating the [1967] occupation and establishing an independent
Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.” (10) In 1989, Hamas spiritual leader
Sheikh Ahmad Yassin (assassinated by Israel in March 2004) stated,
“I do not want to destroy Israel…. We want to negotiate with Israel
so the Palestinian people inside and outside Palestine can live in Palestine.
Then the problem will cease to exist.” (11) The hard-line Hamas leader, Abdel
Aziz Rantisi, assassinated by Israel in April 2004 commented in
2002 that, “[T]he Intifada is about forcing Israel’s withdrawal
to the 1967 borders.” This “doesn’t mean the Arab-Israeli conflict
will be over,” but rather that the armed resistance to Israel would
end.” (12) In a 2004 report published by the
highly regarded International Crisis Group, “During the 1987-1993
uprising, Hamas leaders proposed various formulas for Israeli withdrawal
to the June 4th 1967 borders, to be reciprocated with a decades’-long
truce (hudna).” That same report notes that, “In a March
1988 meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, and then with
Defense Minister Rabin in June 1989, Hamas leader (now FM) Mahmud Zahar
explicitly proposed an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 boundaries, to
be followed by a negotiated permanent settlement.” The offer was refused.
(13) III.
In a CounterPunch
article posted on 24 February 2006, I wrote that the Hamas leadership
had “clearly and repeatedly” called for an independent Palestinian
state on the lands occupied by Israel in 1967. (14) I received numerous
emails demanding “proof” of this assertion and calling me a traitor,
a liar, a Nazi, a terrorist sympathizer and an anti-Semite. The statements
included in this piece should help put to rest those accusations. Indeed,
the statements made to this effect by Hamas members here are but a small
sampling of similar statements made over the years that are part of
the public (though unreported) record. Surely, one can find many remarks
by Hamas leaders over the years that are much less conciliatory, indeed
even inflammatory and often disturbing. It would be misleading to suggest
otherwise. Nonetheless the trend especially in the past few years up
to the present has been toward a more conciliatory, indeed more realistic
policy. As Crisis Group analyst Mouin Rabbani has written,
“On Hamas I would not hesitate to say that the organization as a whole
has essentially reconciled itself to a two-state settlement as a strategic
option but has not formally adopted this as an organisational position.
Yasin, Rantisi, Abu Shanab, Mashal, etc. have all made such statements.
Have they made others that contradict them? Of course. But I think it
can safely be concluded the strategic decisions have been made, the
tactics remain unresolved and the formalities will come last.” The
question for us is whether or not we will give Hamas the chance to translate
their words into actions. Rabbani writes, “it would be as naïve to
take the above statements on faith as it would be foolish not to put
them to the test.”(15) As Menachem Klein points out in a
recent Haaretz article, “The political texts of Hamas indicate
that at present the organization is not fundamentalist.” (16) It has
moved away from the ideological demands of its Charter into a pragmatism
that seeks to respond to the demands of the day without falling into
the same traps that Fatah and the Fatah-led PA fell into over the years.
It has respected a one-sided truce for the past 16 months –though
with the June 9th Israeli artillery attack on a north Gaza
beach in which 7 civilians died, six of them from the same family, this
truce may have come to an end. Hamas has also agreed to support negotiations
between Abbas and Israel. Hamas’ rejection of Abbas’ call
for a referendum on the Prisoner’s Agreement has nothing to do with
its willingness to accept an independent Palestinian state on ‘67
lands and everything to do with its opposition to those in Fatah and
in Israel, the US and EU who are doing everything in their power to
bring down the Hamas government— and in the most depraved manner:
by starving the population into submission and forcing on it the illegal
diktats of anti-democratic warlords within the occupied Palestinian
territories such as the US-backed Fatah militia leader and former head
of the Preventive Security Services, Mohammad Dahlan. In a June 8th 2006 article in the
Financial Times, Henry Siegman commented on remarks made on Israeli
television by Israeli security expert Ephraim Halevy. He writes, “Why
should Israel care whether Hamas grants it the right to exist, Mr. Halevy
asked. Israel exists and Hamas’s recognition or non-recognition neither
adds to nor detracts from that irrefutable fact. But 40 years after
the 1967 war, a Palestinian state does not exist. The politically consequential
question, therefore, is whether Israel recognizes a Palestinian right
to statehood, not the reverse.” (17) Indeed, until Israel actively agrees
to withdraw to the June 4th 1967 borders, Hamas should not fall into
the trap that Fatah under Yassir Arafat fell into— of conceding more
and more for less and less until there is nothing left. Right now the
US-backed annexation/cantonization program seems likely to bring the
whole Palestinian tragedy to a hideous end. All the maneuverings are
a cover for that, the whole discussion about the referendum included.
Fatah should by now know better than to fall into the hands of US and
Israeli overlords in its quest for local dominance. The fact that it
does not should be reason enough for why it was voted out of power last
January. Hamas has good reasons to demand that Israel, with US urging,
show its good faith first. In the meantime Hamas’ continued opposition
to Abbas’ dubious call for a referendum on the Prisoner’s Agreement
is justified. 1
www.neareastconsulting.com; Press Release: The Palestinian National Dialogue
and call for a Referendum Survey #2, 3 June 2006. 2. See “PA Chief Abbas aims to expand
presidential guard,” by Ze’ev Schiff, Haaretz, 28 May 2006.
www.haaretz.com See also “Talking to Hamas,”
by Alastair Crooke in Prospect, issue 123, June 2006. 3. Ibid, Ze’ev Schiff, Haaretz,
28 May 2006. 4. “Abbas sets Referendum for July
26; Hamas rejects Poll,” Mijal Grinberg and Assaf Uni, Haaretz,
10 June 2006.
www.Haaretz.com 5. “We do not wish to throw them
into the sea,” Interview between Lally Weymouth and Ismail Haniyeh
in the Washington Post, Sunday 26 February 2006. 6. “Hamas leader sets condition
for truce,” on CNN World website, 29 January 2006.
www.cnn.com/2006/World/meast/ 7. “Abbas delays referendum decision,” BBC News, Tuesday 6 June 2006.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ 8.. “Hamas says ready to accept
Palestinian statehood in 1967 border,” in China View, 10 May 2006;
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ 9. “Enter Hamas: the challenges
of political integration,” International Crisis Group Report no. 49,
Amman/Brussels; 18 January 2006. First edition (preliminary) report.
www.crisisgroup.org 10. Ibid; The Hamas Electoral Manifesto
also states, “Yes to a free, independent and sovereign state on every
portion of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Jerusalem without conceding
any part of historic Palestine.” This, of course, will raise red flags
for some, which is why I include it here. I do not want to be accused
of leaving out important statements or phrases. As with other statements,
however, it must be measured against current realities both military
and political.
www.crisisgroup.org 11. “Dealing with Hamas,” International
Crisis Group Report no. 21, Amman/Brussels; 26 January 2004. From an
interview in An-Nahar (Jerusalem), 30 April 1989. Quoted in Ziad
Abu Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism. Op. cit. p.76 12. “Enter Hamas: the challenges
of political integration," International Crisis Group report no.
49, 18 January 2006.
www.crisisgroup.org
13. “Dealing with Hamas,” International
Crisis Group report no. 21, 26 January 2004. Amman/Brussels.
www.crisisgroup.org 14. “For Those Who Haven’t Noticed:
Watching the Dissolution of Palestine,” 24 February 2006; CounterPunch,
edited by Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair,
www.counterpunch.org 15. Mouin Rabbani; personal correspondence.
Also in “Enter Hamas” the ICG preliminary report on Hamas from 18
January 2006.
www.crisisgroup.org
16. “Hamas’ Contradictory Voices,”
by Menachem Klein, Haaretz, 2 June 2006. 17. “The Issue is not Whether Hamas Recognizes Israel,” by Henry Siegman, Financial Times, 8 June 2006.
|