Jennifer Loewenstein
Hamas Leadership: Useful Quotes
NOTE:
The following quotations were taken from the most recent International
Crisis Group Report No. 49, “Enter Hamas: the challenges of
Political Integration”, 18 January 2006. Where applicable
I listed the original source for the quotes. This report also notes, “Hamas leaders
have for some time evoked the notion of a long-term ceasefire or hudna
on the basis of withdrawal to the 1967 lines, setting the stage for
a decades’ long de facto coexistence. …There are increasingly clear
indications that over the past decade [Hamas] has managed to fuse maximalist
ideology with political pragmatism. The evidence suggests that Hamas
is at least prepared to tolerate a negotiated two-state resolution of
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, albeit with more stringent conditions
than enunciated by the PLO. …It would be as naïve to take the
above statements on faith as it would be foolish not to put them to
the test.” (My italics) Note that, when taken together with
the quotes of current (post-PLC elections) leaders, Zahar, Haniyeh,
Duwaik and, in Damascus, Khalid Meshal, the picture one gets is less
far less rigid than the one constantly portrayed in western media reports
and political/diplomatic circles. (See earlier email with references
to these quotations).
QUOTES “[T]he Intifada is about forcing
Israel’s withdrawal to the 1967 borders.” This “doesn’t mean
the Arab-Israeli conflict will be over”, but rather that its armed
character would end. Abdel Aziz Rantisi.
Crisis Group Interview, October 2002, Gaza City. “Hamas is clear in terms of the
historical solution and an interim solution. We are ready for both:
the borders of 1967, a state, elections, and agreement after 10-15 years
of building trust.” Usama Hamdan, Hamas Chief Representative
in Lebanon; CG Interview, Beirut, August 2003. The view that Hamas could one day
sit across the table from Israel is gaining currency. “The [Hamas]
Charter is not the Koran.” (Originally in “Hamas leaders say
charter is not the Koran,” Reuters, 21 September. 2005.) Mahmoud Zahar, Hamas leader
in Gaza, stated in June 2005 that if Hamas becomes “part of the [PA]
government, it would participate in negotiations with Israel.” (Originally
in Middle East International, 23 June 2005.) “Resistance can be in a political
and diplomatic form.” Mahmoud Zahar (originally Mehr News Agency,
Tehran, translated from Persian. BBC Monitoring; 15 Dec. 2005.) “If Hamas achieves a majority I
will defend my rights. One method of achieving my rights is to negotiate
with he who usurped them, i.e., Israel, and I will respect their withdrawal
from the occupied territories on a provisional basis. I will negotiate
for my usurped rights from the river to the sea, but I will suspend
my rights over what was seized before 1967 in order to achieve all my
rights that were taken after 1967, including the full removal of the
settlements.” Sheikh Ahmad Haj Ali, imprisoned Muslim Brotherhood
leader and Hamas legislative candidate. (Crisis Group Interview, Nablus,
July 2005.) “We understand we cannot cancel
Oslo tomorrow. Arafat signed it. But if we inherit Oslo we will demand
that Israel implement it. We will take all legitimate peaceful means,
and if these fail, we will resort to resistance. If necessary, we will
resort to war, including as a last resort a global war against Israel
in which every Muslim will confront Israel as a religious duty.”
Sheikh Ahmad Haj Ali. (CGInterview, Nablus, July 2005.) “I haven’t heard of a decision
inside Hamas that we accept to negotiate with the state of Israel. But
anything which doesn’t conflict with our religion is acceptable for
discussion, and it doesn’t conflict with our religion to negotiate
with Israel. It’s a political decision, not a religious principle.
If we have a disagreement, we have a principle: the majority decides.”
Khalid Saada, veteran Hamas member deported to Lebanon by Israel
in 1993. (Crisis Group Interview, Bethlehem, Nov. 2005.) “When we talk about politics, it
means we have accepted the 1967 borders. We accepted to have our state.
Limited land swaps are a minor thing. The Palestinian people agreed
to forget 78 per cent of our land.” Spokesperson Muhammad Ghazal,
now in an Israeli jail. (CGInterview, Nablus, Sept. 2005.) “It is premature to speak of an
important change in the movement’s positions, but it is natural that
the movement determines its positions on the various issues –including
issues on which it has previously taken positions –in light of new
developments and realities. The movement is not immobile in its political
positions, which are based on a set of principles and values.”
Khaled Meshal, Hamas Politburo Head. (Originally,
www.aljazeera.net, 12 Nov. 2005, translated from the Arabic.) “Sheikh Ahmad Yassin said that the
principle of negotiations is not prohibited, but the problem is the
basis on which they take place. Anyone who advocates negotiations over
less than the 1967 borders will be entering the same tunnel as the PA.
Hamas would prefer others to conduct the negotiations while they remain
behind the scenes. They will have a presence to ensure that basic rights
are preserved.” Leading Palestinian Islamist academic close to
Hamas. An-Najah University. (CGInterview, Nablus, Sept. 2005.) “We have accepted the principle
of accepting a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. If it’s
in the interest of the people, we’re prepared.” Hasan Yousif,
West Bank Hamas political leader. (CGInterview, Ramallah, August 2005.) Hamas Electoral Manifesto,
released mid-January 2006: “Our nation is at a stage of national liberation,
and it has the right to act to regain its rights and end the occupation
by using all means including armed resistance.” “Yes to a free,
independent, and sovereign state on every portion of the West Bank,
Gaza Strip and Jerusalem without conceding any part of historic Palestine.” Hamas Electoral Manifesto,
Article 1:1: “All Palestine is part of the Arab and Islamic homeland.”
Article 5:1: calls for “adherence to the goal of defeating the [1967]
occupation and establishing an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem
as its capital.” In “Hamas charter mentions armed
struggle but not Israel’s destruction,” Arnon Regular, Haaretz,
11 January 2006, Regular argues that the Hamas [election] manifesto
“does not differ substantially from that of the Palestinian Authority
Chairman Mahmoud Abbas’ Fatah faction.” “We’ll negotiate [with Israel]
better than the others, who negotiated for 10 years and achieved nothing….In
the past it was said that we don’t understand politics, only force,
be we are a broad, well-grounded movement that is active in all areas
of life. Now we are proving that we also understand politics better
than the others…. We are not saying ‘never’. The question of negotiations
will be presented to the new parliament and, as with every issue, when
we reach the parliament it will be discussed and decided in a rational
manner.” Muhammad Abu Tair, just prior to his arrest. Number
two on Hamas’ list. (Originally in “Hamas No. 2: ‘We understand
politics; we’ll negotiate better than others,” Haaretz,
15 January 2006.) From “Dealing With Hamas,” International Crisis Group Report No. 21, Amman/Brussels; 26 January 2004.
During the 1987-1993 uprising, Hamas leaders proposed various formulas for Israeli withdrawal to the 4 June 1967
borders, to be reciprocated with a decades-long truce (hudna).
In 1987, and again in 1989, Shaikh Yasin stated, “I do not want to
destroy Israel….We want to negotiate with Israel so the Palestinian
people inside and outside Palestine can live in Palestine. Then the
problem will cease to exist”.1 In a March 1988 meeting
with Foreign Minister Peres, and then with Defence Minister Rabin in
June 1989, Hamas leader Mahmud Zahhar explicitly proposed an Israeli
withdrawal to the 1967 boundaries, to be followed by a negotiated permanent
settlement.2 A senior UN official in 2002 asked
Mahmoud Zahhar, “Suppose that tomorrow, the PA and Israel reach agreement
to establish a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders alongside Israel.
A referendum is held, which shows clear Palestinian popular support
for the peace agreement. What would Hamas do?” Zahhar responded: “Hamas
will never go against the will of the Palestinian people”.3
Zahhar later insisted to ICG: Hamas is not in favour of violent
change or coups. We want the unity of the Palestinian people. Hamas
was always a political organisation, whose activities encompassed all
levels – economic, social, and political. It is ready for political
competition in elections. We favour elections, but for independence,
not self-rule. Once there is an independent Palestinian state, we shall
participate on all levels.4 Also from the same Report: In a recent interview, Shaikh Yasin
stated: “the goal of our resistance is that all Palestinians can live
in their homeland, in a situation in which all religions coexist together,
Moslems, Christians and Jews. We are against a Jewish apartheid state
in Palestine”.5 Moreover, by apparently conditioning a
temporary peace rather than a permanent settlement on the return of
Palestinian refugees, Hamas is further – and significantly – diluting
the concession it seemed to make. In short, while its rejection of a
negotiated settlement has waned over the years, Hamas has not renounced
its ideal of establishing a state throughout Mandatory Palestine. It
seems it would prefer a forced, unilateral Israeli withdrawal to the
1967 boundaries – which would commit Palestinians to nothing and for
which it could claim much of the credit – to a negotiated settlement.
Hamas’s implicit endorsements of
a two-state settlement thus may simply reflect tactical calculations
that the struggle will resume once a Palestinian state is established
or that signalling flexibility is an appropriate response to the constant
pressures to which it has been subjected.6 As expressed by a senior officer in
the Israeli reserves: “If Hamas were to change its agenda of destroying
Israel, it would cease to be Hamas”.7 Continued statements
by leading Palestinian Islamists that they remain committed to the forcible
dissolution of the Jewish state lend credence to such assertions,8
as – implicitly – does the movement’s increasingly strident assertion
that because of Israeli intransigence, “a credible two-state settlement
will not materialise”.9 The stated willingness to abide by
elections is equally open to question. Hamas has consistently participated
in a variety of sub-national contests, such as for university student
councils and professional associations and typically adhered to rules
of democratic conduct when it lost. But that does not necessarily indicate
how it would react to popular endorsement of a permanent political settlement
that fundamentally contradicted its political program. Those inclined to take a more positive
view of the Hamas leaders’ pronouncements tend to underscore the internal
dimension of its agenda. The movement, they argue, is realistic enough
to know that it cannot destroy Israel; in their view, Hamas’s primary
agenda is actually to enhance its role in domestic Palestinian affairs.
They also tend to explain the resort to armed opposition largely by
its desire to displace the PA and Fatah and emerge as the leading Palestinian
organisation once a state has been established. Others add that the
political structure of the Palestinian polity, and specifically the
extent to which it enables Hamas to further its domestic ambitions through
conventional political means, will importantly influence the path the
Islamists choose in the aftermath of a peace agreement.10 The broader, unanswered question,
is whether Hamas intends to acquire influence in order to alter the
Palestinian approach to the peace process fundamentally or in order
to enhance its own eventual role within the recognised political and
security boundaries of a two-state settlement. The response, quite probably,
is that Hamas would like to achieve both objectives, emulating and ultimately
amplifying the role played by Hizbollah in Lebanon, becoming the central
power in Palestine and achieving an informal and indefinite but strained
coexistence with Israel on its terms, not those traditionally put forward
by the PA. There is much in its recent behaviour
to back the view that Hamas wants to become a recognised and indispensable
domestic and regional player: its tougher stance in negotiations with
the PA and demands for fairer power-sharing arrangements, reflecting
increased confidence in its strength (and in the PA’s weakness); enhanced
engagement with regional actors and signals it desires contacts with
the U.S.; and its statement of interest in a temporary peace with Israel
on the basis of the 1967 borders. To some extent, the ongoing debates
reflect not only divisions among those seeking to assess Hamas intentions
but also the movement’s multiple agendas. In the words of a former
Israeli intelligence commander, Hamas is “a movement, something much
wider than an organisation, composed of many sections and strands”,
which may hold differing views as to the relative weight to be allocated
to social, political and military activities.11 For those
who believe this, regional and other international actors should devise
policies that promote the more pragmatic elements within the Hamas leadership
and particularly those who privilege the domestic social and religious
as opposed to military components of the movement’s agenda.12
__________________________________ 1 Interview, Al-Nahar (Jerusalem), 30 April 1989. Quoted in Abu Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism, op. cit., p. 76. 2 Hroub, Hamas, op. cit., p. 200. In an interview with ICG, Yossi Beilin indirectly confirmed his participation in the meeting between Zahhar and Peres (“My first encounter with Hamas was in 1988”), Tel Aviv, 17 July 2003. 3 ICG interview, UNSCO HQ, Gaza City, 19 May 2002. 4 ICG interview, Zahhar, 5 August 2003. 5 Der Spiegel, N°50, 8 December 2003, p. 144. 6 ICG interview, British diplomat, Jerusalem, 11 September 2003. 7 ICG interview, retired senior Israeli military intelligence officer, Tel Aviv, 11 November 2003. 8 See, for example, statements by Abd-al-Aziz Rantisi in Ibrahim Barzak, “Israel Tries to Kill Hamas Head”, Associated Press, 11 June 2003. While some correspondents interpreted Rantisi’s call – issued immediately after an Israeli attempt on his life – “not to leave one Jew in Palestine” as a reference to the occupied territories (e.g. “Israeli Raid Wounds a Key Hamas Aide”, International Herald Tribune, 11 June 2003), the choice of words renders this unlikely. 9 ICG telephone interview, Amayreh, 16 December 2003. 10 Ziad Abu Amr, Basim Zbeidi, presentations on the prospects for Hamas’s transformation into a political party, conference in Ramallah organised by The Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy (MUWATIN), 17 December 2003. 11 ICG interview, former Israeli intelligence commander, Ramat Gan, 5 November 2003. More than forming rival and competing wings within the movement, the Hamas “sections” reportedly tend to differ on the emphasis they place upon the movement’s social, political and military roles – which collectively enjoy a consensus within the organisation. Several Israeli, Palestinian, and foreign observers interviewed by ICG by contrast felt that different elements within Hamas are openly vying for control of the movement. 12 ICG interviews, Ghassan Khatib, PA Minister of
Labour, Ramallah, 4 December 2003; Muhammad Hourani, Palestinian parliamentarian
and member of West Bank Fatah Higher Committee, 6 December 2003. |